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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S FACTS 
1. Mr. Willey complains that appellant is simply 
attempting to retry this matter by using only her versions of the 
facts to support her arguments. Yet Mr. Willey does exactly the 
same when he recites as a matter of fact that "the parties lived 
beyond their means". He then supports this unfounded conclusion 
by claiming that "the parties bought a Mercedes in 1987" (which 
only he drove and continues to drive); "they refinanced"; "they 
borrowed"; "they liquidated"; "they borrowed again". (Pg* 3 and 
4 of Appellee's Brief.) 
The facts speak to a more successful and traditional 
marital relationship where Mrs. Willey stayed home and acted as 
the homemaker, and Mr. Willey earned substantial income and 
controlled the finances. A comparison of income earned as set 
forth in Exhibit 34D, (portions of which are restated on page 6 
of Appellant's Brief) demonstrate this relationship. After their 
first year of marriage, Mrs. Willey earned approximately 
$5,000.00 per year for three years, and then averaged $1,550.00 
gross per year for the next five years until their first full 
year of separation. During that same time frame, Mr. Willey 
initially averaged $63,500.00 per year, and then, as found by the 
Court, $110,000.00 for the next five years. Contrast those facts 
with Mr. Willey's expected assertion at trial that he "urged Mrs. 
Willey to work full-time" during the marriage and that her 
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refusal to do so was a cause of major disagreement. Appellee's 
Brief at p. 3. 
2. The facts further demonstrate that both parties 
voluntarily lived a high standard of living well within their 
ability on the substantial income earned during this marriage. 
As indicated, they had numerous parties, entertained frequently, 
traveled together, lived in a large expensive home, dressed well, 
and drove expensive automobiles. All of this lavish lifestyle 
required some degree of financing which was easily satisfied out 
of current income. In the two "lean" years of 1989 and 1990 when 
Mr. Willey only made $73,000.00 and $98,000.00, respectively, Mr. 
Willey was able to maintain his lifestyle through available 
credit and the use of substantial accumulated savings and other 
assets. To suggest that they lived far beyond their means is not 
consistent with either the evidence or any finding entered by the 
trial court. 
3. When the parties separated, Mrs. Willey did go 
back to work at two jobs, the equivalent of full-time work. She 
has always maintained that she would work to support herself 
full-time. Her two jobs included retail sales in a book shop, 
three days per week and teaching numerous literature groups at 
night. Had Mrs. Willey not required surgery in August of 1991 
her gross earnings would have been the equivalent of full-time 
wages at $5.00 per hour. (TR. p. 58). 
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4. Final r *+ ^ai^ 10 ~* M~ T47' 1 1 ev" «= Brief where 11 
is stated, "it is c * *^ ' vi ^ - ^ \ <ls "<-*'! h^n^fit Mrs, 
Wi 1 1 oy f *' ' l» i I n I "' * I 
neither party wai = i-^i • u n- .*::«*r i. / 
evidence concerning Mrs .dr«». »ii^-. < 
: , Late 
: . ;t-v u« M'tii i r urn unsubstantiated conclusion. In 
fa<..t thf'!*-- wis :« • ' • • M 1 P*- wouJ d ] i ke to have advised the 
1 c osts ai id problems she now must 
face because O" nliev relationship to the children, 
was unable to do so. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENTS 
I• The "Jones" Factors Were Not Properly Applied. 
Mr. wt =1-*• ' t t emr1 s 
f - , regarding Mrs, WJ J :*ry ^ sit-^d-- the 
theory that she presented conflicting evidence and .ai^tu L^ ask 
the court to make an\ -. 
If conflict ;,4^  evidence wa.-> offered (which Appellant 
denie incumbent upon the tria >i >ake 
findings 
- . -... ... : u • . bindings ••, .H, essentia] 
elemen • t . - abused xts discretion, h^ B H , 
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All of the three "Jones" factors critical to the 
alimony issue are closely interrelated. The first essential 
material element, the needs of the recipient spouse, drive the 
consideration of the remaining factors. Do the spouse's needs 
include obligations to pay creditors? Do her needs include 
obligations for the primary care of her natural children? 
If Mrs. Willey's needs and the critical elements of 
those needs are never considered, a trial court cannot assess the 
remaining "Jones" considerations. Since it was unknown prior to 
a sale of their marital home and prior to trial if a deficiency 
would be owed on the second mortgage, Mrs. Willey requested, but 
the trial court denied, her motion to continue the trial pending 
a sale of the home, since to do otherwise invites the court to 
engage in unsubstantiated speculation related to her possible 
obligations (TR. pp 4-6). That is exactly what happened. 
Mr. Willey1s notation at page 13, footnote 1 of his 
Brief criticizing Mrs. Willey1s speculation of the debt owed by 
her on the note formerly secured by their home is well taken. 
For the same reason, the trial court should not have speculated 
on what Mrs. Willeyfs debts would be or on her ability to pay 
those debts. Appellant was attempting to argue the best known 
facts available at the time her brief was written, but she agrees 
that on this record the size of her obligation and ability to pay 
is unknown. 
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Tl i is appea embraces two critical issues, both n* which 
are focused b> * :• Arties briefs « does V- -' » •-^  s 
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addressee ...... provision, however, speak? husbands 
obligation to fiis wile, but to 1 lis separate oDiigaL±un t ir 
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Mrs. Wille strongly believes, ai. \nus argues, that 
while Mr. Wil]« ' -^parate legal 
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disregard her lega] } 
CM rcumstances. 
Evidence of Need Not Conflictin Exhibit 36D was 
subm court what 
Mrs. .-• expenses might be if individua.l .ly considered, ___ 
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comparison with expenses for herself and her children for whom 
she has a legal obligation. The exhibit assumed, for argument 
purposes, that she would only be entitled to expend exactly what 
Mr. Willey required in his exhibit of monthly expenses (Exhibit 
10-P). Mrs. Willey's comparison exhibit 36-D was intended simply 
for argument purposes to demonstrate at least equal needs if the 
court was only going to consider her needs alone and not those of 
her children. The only difference between Exhibit 27-D and 36-D 
are adjustments made for the sale of the marital home and for 
discretionary child care expenses, such as allowances, 
extracurricular activities, and other amounts associated only 
with the children's care. Otherwise, Mrs. Willey1s needs remain 
the same, now and throughout the trial. 
Had the trial court made findings related to Mrs. 
Willey's financial needs, the mistakes of fact which the court 
made in assessing her ability to contribute to those needs and 
the amount her husband should contribute, would have become 
apparent. It is reversible error if the trial court fails to 
make specific findings on all material issues unless the facts in 
the record are "clear, uncontroverted and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment." Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988). 
Standard of Living. Mrs. Willey's responses and 
arguments rests heavily on a recurring theme that Mrs. Willey 
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ought to be returned to that standard of living enjoyed by her 
prior to her marriage to Mr, Willey in 1980. She and her 
children enjoyed the benefits as long as it lasted; she ought to 
return to the life and job skills she knew then. In Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), this Court rejected the 
argument that because the wife could not have achieved on her own 
a standard enjoyed by her during her marriage, she was 
accordingly not entitled to an equal share or consideration of 
substantial marital assets. The various factors to be considered 
in fashioning equitable property and support provisions do not 
include a consideration that one partner was more economically 
productive than the other. 
While the Dunn holding applied to a division of marital 
assets, its holding bears equal weight upon the implication that 
Mrs. Willey return to a standard of the 1980's while Mr. Willey 
be free to move forward with substantial resources. 
Mrs. Willey supported her husband's move toward greater 
financial success during the prime years of her life, giving up 
in return employment opportunities which could have been just as 
rewarding to her. 
Because he now has the opportunity to earn tremendous 
income and she does not, why must the court impose a standard for 
her which is far below his standard of living? 
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II. Reply to Reasonableness of Attorney Fee. 
Mrs. Willey also believes it unfortunate that both 
parties had to expend significant fees in the presentation of 
this matter before the trial court. Nowhere, however, did the 
trial court find that the fees expended by either party were 
unreasonable. What may be "implicit" to appellee is not implicit 
to appellant. It is unfortunate that Mr. Willey can pay all of 
his fees from marital funds, or divert earnings that could have 
been used to pay marital debt, without scrutiny of the trial 
court, yet Mrs. Willey must demonstrate reasonableness, need and 
financial inability to recognize that her expenditures for 
attorney fees went to the same purpose and end, to wit: the 
dissolution of the marriage. Mrs. Willey met that burden, but 
the court failed to award her all her fees. The trial court did 
not find, implicitly or explicitly, that her fees were 
unreasonable. 
III. Reply to Other Issues. 
Mr. Willey asserts that Appellant's brief violates the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in three respects: 
i) that it fails to indicate the standard of 
review, 
ii) does not contain a summary of the arguments; 
and 
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iii) it contains references to the transcript of 
trial rather than the official record. 
Appellant's counsel apologizes to the Court for inadvertently 
omitting the Summary of Argument section when compiling the 
Appellant's Brief in its final version. That section is now 
contained in the Addendum to this brief, with the well known 
standards of review which were previously contained in the 
docketing statement and which have been correctly recited by 
Appellee's Brief. 
References to the trial transcript were recited from 
the copy which Appellant obtained from the official reporter. 
The copy did not have the record pagination and for that, counsel 
seeks your forgiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
Since few assets remained following the dissolution of 
this marriage and the liquidation of marital assets, virtually 
all of the court's determinations concerning alimony, division of 
property, division of debts and award of attorney's fee affect 
Mrs. Willey's ability to continue her post-marital life. 
Virtually all of the other equitable determinations made by the 
trial court have adverse impact upon Mrs. Willey's need for 
support and upon a fair determination of Mr. Willey's 
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contribution to that need. Accordingly, it is respectfully urged 
that this matter be reversed and remanded for re-trial on all 
issues. 
DATED this /<%**£ day of October, 1992. 
Ro^er D. Sandbjzfk (#2856) 
Attorney for Appellant 
Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court improperly applied the Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah App. 1985), considerations by 
failing to make findings concerning Mrs. Willeyfs needs including 
her obligations to her children. The court's failure affected 
not only the other Jones factors, but also a fair consideration 
of property and debt distribution. The standard of review is an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
2. The trial court erred in failing to provide Mrs. 
Willey consideration for premarital contribution to the parties' 
home. Mrs. Willey alleges an error of law in the application of 
the District Court's findings. 
3. Whether the court erred by failing to award a 
larger contribution towards necessary attorney's fees and costs. 
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion. 
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